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The concept of the diagram plays an important, yet under-considered, role in the philosophies of Charles 
Sanders Peirce and Gilles Deleuze. Both philosophies, whilst having given rise to a somewhat bewildering 
array of defining nominations between them, may perhaps be best described as constructivist—for they both 
support a conception of reality as constructed, rather than given, and constructed in/as thought. For both, a 
“diagram” is the agent of this construction; hence its pivotal place in both systems. It is, in fact from Peirce 
that Deleuze borrows the concept, for its function as genetic agency, whilst, however, submitting it to a radical 
reworking that rejects the broadly representational philosophical framework within which Peirce situates it. 
An understanding of this reworking, which has hitherto received little sustained attention, permits clarification 
not only of Deleuze’s and Peirce’s understanding of philosophy as constructivist, but also of the (generally 
poorly understood) relation between these two philosophies, rarely thought together, whilst presenting some 
of the most trenchant  stakes, and potentials, of diagrammatics as a constructive, pragmatic, and experimental 
venture.1
The paper is set out in four sections. Following a brief overview of the contrasting conceptions of diagrammatics 
by Peirce and Deleuze (part 1), I discuss the main features and functions of Peirce’s diagram, and its function 
in his philosophy, (part 2) and Deleuze’s borrowing and reworking of the concept for his own project (part 
3). I conclude with an exploration of the contrasting conceptions of the future implicated by the two models: 
Peirce’s notion of “speculative rhetoric”, which presents the diagram as speculatively determining the future 
on the basis of the present possibilities of thought, and Deleuze’s diagrammatic construction of the future as 
the affirmation of the intensive forces of the “outside” that eternally exceeds that which thought can represent 
to itself 
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1. PEIRCE’S DIAGRAM, AND DELEUZE’S DIAGRAM: SOME INITIAL POINTS OF 
DISTINCTION.
For both Peirce and Deleuze the diagram is the agent of the construction of reality. But there are two distinct 
conceptions of reality implicated here. For Peirce - committed logician and practicing scientist - reality is 
that mode of being asserted by a true proposition, regardless of what any actual mind thinks of it; reality is 
logical truth, independent of the actual experience or thought that is subject to empirical or dogmatic error.2 
For Deleuze, in contrast, reality is that mode of being of material existence, in contrast to (logical) possibility. 
Furthermore the Deleuzian project is oriented not towards an already existing reality, whether actual or 
conceived, but towards the construction of “new” reality that does not already exist. So whilst for Peirce the 
construction of reality entails the acquisition of logical truths through a process of refining thought (through 
diagrams), for Deleuze construction involves the production of a new reality (through diagrams). Whereas 
for Peirce the function of a diagram is to aid thought’s process of approaching logical truth; for Deleuze, 
diagrammatic construction is not grounded on what can—according to present criteria—be deemed truthful, 
but rather is directed towards the production of new values “not inspired by truth” and beyond any established 
measure.3 
As the process of thought’s refinement, Peirce’s construction entails the representation of thought’s 
representational processes through diagrams, and the concomitant adjustment and refinement of these processes 
in order to more closely attain to truth. 4 For Deleuze however, construction is not grounded in already existent 
processes of thought, but rather generated from the synthesis of what he calls “pure” difference, difference “in-
itself”, independent of “the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same”.5   
Peirce describes the diagram as a map or schema, an “icon of relations” through which a future state is 
constructed on the basis of an existing state, through the representation, and formalisation, of relations between 
terms. This (relatively new) future state resembles past states through the diagrammatic construction of laws 
that relate the two via the mediation of the present. For Deleuze, however, the diagram is a map of “pure 
relations” - relations of forces “outside” related terms - a map of “lines of escape” that break through all law in 
a transcendental and unmediated construction of the qualitatively new (that which is new in kind) which bears 
no resemblance to past or present actuality. Peirce’s diagram retains a resonance with the “common-sensical” 
notion of the diagram as a “simplified drawing” or “schematic representation” of something. It functions as an 
aid to knowledge, operating within the regime of what may possibly be known given the present conditions 
of thought, assuming a form that can be recognised, and oriented towards the formalisation of a future state 
that can be projected on the basis of present actuality. But Deleuze’s conception of the diagram as the agent of 
breakthrough and creation, as a non-representational, groundless, deforming and unformed synthesiser of pure 
difference, subverts such common-sensical definition and demands a new conceptual framework. 
These initial distinctions indicate two strongly contrasting philosophical positions, both invested in the 
production of diagrams: an idealist philosophy of representation that seeks to interpret the world through the 
logical processes of thought (Peirce), and a philosophy of difference that seeks to invest difference as the 
“source” of thought anew (Deleuze).
2. PEIRCE’S DIAGRAM: RESEMBLANCE AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
Inventor of a rich, and notoriously complex system whose contributions to and consequences for philosophy 
have perhaps yet to be fully grasped, C.S Peirce made it his life’s work to impart to traditional problems 
of metaphysics and epistemology a consistently pragmatic orientation, via a rigorous architectonic of logic, 
“objective” reasoning, and “scientific” method.6 It is above all for two things that he is most widely known: 
firstly, as the father of pragmatism (after his fellow pragmatist William James’ accreditation to him of this 
distinction); secondly, for his tripartite theory of signs. And it is for both these definitive features that his system 
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will appeal to Deleuze, who, with Felix Guattari, also engages in the articulation of a pragmatic semiotic—that 
is, a theory of signs orientated to their practical bearing on the “conduct of life”.7
For Peirce, the idea that thought or conception (the two are for him equated) must be aligned with its conceivable 
practical effects in the world (pragmatism) must be understood as a semiotics (or ‘semeiotic’, as he preferred 
to call it), that is, a system of signs. Indeed, the sign is nothing other than a thought, one whose meaning is not 
self-evident, but rather determined by the process of its  interpretation by a subsequent thought or action—or 
to put it another way, by its effect on another sign.8 Insofar as a sign points at once to its object (or referent), 
and to the thought that interprets it (its interpretant), this pragmatic semiotic/semiotic pragmatics is tripartite, 
or triadic. Again, what is particularly distinctive about Peirce’s system is the attribution of scientific, or logical, 
determinacy to this pragmatic semiotic; an understanding of thought as a rigorous, scientific method, governed 
by the ultimate, speculatively projected attainment of truth. 
The diagram, or as Peirce also calls it, “existential graph”, plays a central role within this system.9 It may be most 
simply understood as Peirce’s answer to a central problem in post-Kantian philosophy—the reconciliation of 
reason with experience, of rational ideas with existential facts, of the “generals” of a cognition not grounded in 
experience with the “particulars” with which experience furnishes cognition. This reconciliation, which Peirce 
calls “the method of discovery”, takes place through the diagrammatic mapping of facts, and construction of 
laws that allows us to pass from particulars to generals. This experimental method—it is adjusted as it proceeds 
- may be understood as the counterpart to pragmatism - for if “pragmatism says that ideas work themselves out 
in facts”, the method of discovery “says that ideas may be discovered through facts”.10 Both processes are of 
course mutually implicated within a project that sets out to develop a theory of reasoning ideally in contact with 
(rather than noministically abstracted from) the empirical. 
 A mental construction, a type of sign, which may or may not take visual form (such as a graph), the diagram 
represents a “premiss” (a preliminary assertion—also called a “predicate” or “precept”) whilst pointing 
towards, or “outlining”, an outcome. The diagram can, indeed, be understood as the basis of all thought, where 
thought “always takes place by means of signs”, and is logical—that is, “self-controlled, or deliberated”. 
Indeed, a diagram is that “by means of which any course of thought can be represented with exactitude.”11 
Peirce conceives of this diagrammatic thought as a (representational) process—diagrammatism is the process 
of thought’s “self-controlling” or “deliberation”, a process of “reasoning”, where “reasoning is essentially a 
voluntary act, over which we exercise control”.12
A diagram, Peirce tells us,
 is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a general predicate and from the observation 
of this icon [specifically the relations between its parts] we are supposed to construct a new general 
predicate.13 
The process of reasoning consists, he tells us, 
in constructing a diagram according to a general precept, in observing certain relations between parts 
of that diagram not explicitly required by the precept, showing that these relations will hold for all 
such diagrams, and in formulating this conclusion in general terms.14
The diagram, then, is a schema of relations, that allows us to go beyond a given theoretical premiss/originary 
assertion to new assertions, by constructing laws, formulae or rules. These rules guarantee that the “new” 
relations constructed by the diagram will “hold for all such diagrams”. That is, the role of the diagram is as 
generator of the laws that permit the determination of the future with increasingly greater clarity, to aid the 
movement of logic from the vague (particulars) to the definite (general), the movement of thought’s “self-
controlling” towards its ultimate destination: truth.
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This process of definition or clarification takes place within the regime of resemblance. Diagrammatic 
determination of the future is iconic, Peirce tells us, and an icon is a sign which signifies its object through 
resemblance: “likenessness, or, as I prefer to say, Icons, […] serve to represent their objects only in so far as 
they resemble them in themselves”.15  
A diagram is a type of icon—specifically an icon of relations.16 It signifies its object not through direct 
resemblance of its form, but as a representation of the relations of its objects by analogous relations in its own 
parts. This makes it “particularly useful because it suppresses a quantity of details, and so allows the mind more 
easily to think of the important features.”17 It is a form of relations, and its “schematic” character lies precisely 
in this reductive formalisation.
So the diagram is the formal presentation of the relations of a given premiss. This can (but does not have to) 
assume a visual form, “composed of dots, lines etc., in which logical relations are signified by such spatial 
relations that the necessary consequences of these logical relations are at the same time signified, or can, at 
least, be made evident by transforming the diagram in certain ways which conventional ‘rules’ permit.”18 All 
“necessary reasoning” proceeds by such diagrammatic constructions—this necessity being due to the fact that 
we know (or come to know) the conditions of the diagram (and not their actual conformity with empirical 
cases).19
It is the form of the diagram that may be worked on to achieve its function of rendering these consequences. As 
such, the diagram is not only an exact representation of a given premiss, but a form to which “something else” 
may be added, experimentally—“which is usually a mere May-be”.20 This experimental addition is, for Peirce, 
the constructive aspect of the diagram, the aspect that takes it beyond pure relationality—beyond the relation 
between itself and its object—and imparts to it a “third” component, as constructive “determination” of the 
future. It is a course of thought that the diagram represents, a course that is dynamic and ongoing.
Thus diagrammatics is not just a re-presentational mapping of an originary premiss. It more crucially concerns 
the attainment of truths which are not immediately evident from premises. The function of the diagram is to 
excavate general and universal truths (the outcome has to be shown to hold “for all such” diagrams) from 
particular assertions. And yet, whilst this construction adds something to representation, it nevertheless remains 
inscribed within a representational regime: the experimental additions of “may-be’s” is reintegrated into an 
ongoing process of thought’s representation of itself to the (ideal) point of final, universal validity (truth).
To consider this inscription let us consider  more closely the four stages of the  diagrammatic method: firstly, 
the formation of the icon; secondly, the observation on and experimentation with the icon; thirdly, the arrival at 
a conclusion; fourthly, the establishment of the universal validity of the conclusion. 
The first step is to “form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic….representation of the facts, as 
skeletonized as possible….to represent intuitively or semi-intuitively the same relations which are abstractly 
expressed in the premises”.21 Following this formation of an icon, there is observation of and (perhaps) 
experimentation with the icon. Either the truth of the conclusion is drawn from the observation of the diagram 
as it is—in which case, the process is called “corollarial”—or “having represented the conditions of the 
conclusion in a diagram” we perform an ingenious experiment upon the diagram, and by the observation of 
the diagram, so modified, ascertain the truth of the conclusion—a process Peirce calls “theorematic”.22 It is 
this theorematic aspect of diagrammatisation, whereby “something else” is added, experimentally, and which 
Peirce also calls “experimental observation”, which constitutes its constructive component. Here, the diagram 
is “submitted to the scrutiny of observation, and new relations are discovered among its parts, not stated in 
the precept by which it was formed, and are found, by a little mental experimentation, to be such that they will 
always be present in such a construction”.23 Through this “experimental observation” of diagrams we arrive 
at a conclusion (the third step) with “universal validity” in so far as it will be shown to be always be the case 
under a set of certain conditions (the fourth step). Diagrammatism thus initiates a process by which “the mind 
is not only led from believing the premises to judge the conclusion true, but it further attaches to this judgment 
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another—that every proposition like the premiss … would involve, and compel acceptance of, a proposition 
related to it as the conclusion then drawn is related to that premiss”.24In this way, the diagram serves as a model 
for similar hypothetical cases—it is a map of the necessary outcomes of reason in an “arbitrarily hypothetical 
universe…. Not yet entirely determinate”.25 The moment of experimentation, where thought alters its course 
from what is immediately given by the premiss, is ultimately geared towards the consolidation of this course, 
once it has been found to be “necessary”. It is not to point to new outcomes each time a diagram is drawn, but to 
consolidate a single outcome for all times (such that successive diagrams will reveal the same conclusion)—in 
other words, a truth, or final interpretant - an outcome that will, with future experiments, be shown to be always 
present26
Thus the diagrammatic process exposes the tripartite system of analogies that characterises Peirce’s semeiotic, 
and provides its many subdivisions. The conclusion of a diagram that represents its object through analogous 
relations is returned to the interpretation of other similar premises, which is returned to the “expanded” diagram, 
and so on.27 A three-way process of grounding is established via the diagram between objects, signs and 
interpretants—the three dynamic elements of the semiotic process—where the sign is that which is determined 
by its “object”, and which in turn determines an effect, its “interpretant”28—as a process of thought’s self-
clarification and extraction of similarity, as law, between different cases.
 
Diagrammatism is a process of generalisation. Hence, whilst it always “has to start from a perceptual fact”, 
its proximity to “the real thinking-process” is “doubtful”, where this “real thinking-process” is a “particular”, 
or “finite” process of thinking that you or I may pass through. Indeed, the inferential, ideal process of 
diagrammatism is “of an entirely different construction from the thinking process”—because it is generalised, 
and deals with possibility rather than actuality—what should be thought given a certain set of conditions (as 
ultimately governed by a final truth) rather than what is actually thought by particular individuals. This is 
what characterises Peirce’s system as “idealist”, and diagrammatism as “ideal reasoning”, and, ultimately, 
speculative (a point we will return to).29
This ideal possibility attains its “forcefulness” through the diagram’s “compelling design”. But what does 
this mean? The design of the diagram is compelling because it is intelligible (it is an icon of “intelligible 
relations”30) - which is to say already intelligible to thought as it is - because the truths it constructs are 
recognisable, because it bears a clarity that appeals to the logical subject waiting to receive it. It is to the appeal 
of logic, which is a form of common sense (a “critical” common-sense)31, that diagrammatic reasoning appeals. 
The “universal validity” of the conclusions diagrammatism produces is predicated on the common structures of 
thought uniting the interpreting subjects; the effectiveness of the rules it constructs is premised on the fact that 
these rules bind “all minds alike”.32 Indeed, “the object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of 
what we already know, something else which we do not know”.33 “Learning” begins with the “immense mass 
of cognition already formed.”34 As Peirce clarifies, “a Diagram is an Icon of a set of rationally related objects. 
By rationally related, I mean that there is between them, not merely one of those relations which we know by 
experience, but know not how to comprehend, but one of those relations which anybody who reasons at all must 
have an inward acquaintance with.”35
It is therefore assumed that the diagrammatic process of learning is shared by a community of rational minds 
with such innateness of reason. This is why the forceful shape of a diagram can be predicted to convince an 
as-yet unspecified subject. The observation of the diagram “leads us to suspect that something is true, which we 
may or may not be able to formulate with precision, and we proceed to inquire whether it is true or not.” Such 
“suspicion” is grounded in “what we already know” - which includes an idea of truth. Peirce states that “we not 
only have to select the features of the diagram which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, but [that] it is also 
of great importance to return again and again to certain features.” Again, if we do not make such a controlled 
selection, or consolidation of the diagram’s compelling design “although our conclusions may be correct they 
will not be the particular conclusions at which we are aiming.”36 Thus, we can understand the diagram as a kind 
of confirmation, or “substantiation” of our “beliefs” (which provide the basis of all our premises)37, subject to 
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our rational control.
In this way we see the function of Peirce’s diagram as a tool for thought (as reasoning), a process of experimentally 
attaining truths grounded in the recognition of what is already known to us driven by the establishment, through 
laws, of generals or universals, and oriented towards communication within a community of like-minded 
thinkers. Deleuze will borrow this conception of diagrammatics as an experimental synthesis of relations, 
whilst recasting it beyond Peirce’s representationalism, universalism and (logical) communitarianism. 
3. DELEUZE’S DIAGRAM: DIFFERENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
It is perhaps the notion of modulation in general (and not similitude) that will enable us to understand 
the nature of analogical language or the diagram.38 
It is as the inventor of “the most extraordinary classification of images and signs”, of a semiotic with the poten-
tial to think production and oriented to “life”, that Peirce appeals to Deleuze.39 With Guattari, he is specifically 
attracted by Peirce’s conception of signs firstly “not as a function of determinants which are already linguistic”, 
and secondly, “from the point of view of genesis or formation”.40 From this perspective, Peirce offers a power-
ful alternative to what Deleuze and Guattari deem to be the interpretative impasses of (structural) linguistics—a 
pragmatic semiotics that can function as a “science of reality”.41 
It is not from the perspective of meaning or interpretation that they invest Peirce’s concepts. In fact they ex-
plicitly reject this orientation towards meaning which for them renders Peirce “as much a linguist as the semi-
ologists”.42  Rather, it is for his taxonomy of “sign elements [which] still imply no privilege for language”, of 
semiotic material not reduced to linguistic forms, that they turn to him, in their development of a productive, 
asignifying semiotic—a semiotic that is put to work both in the analysis of social mechanisms and in the analy-
sis of artistic practice. Indeed, in his work on the cinema, we find Deleuze engaging in an intensive extraction 
and development of this nonlinguistic semiology for a dizzyingly comprehensive taxonomy of cinematic signs. 
This is a “free use” of Peirce, that borrows his terms “while changing their connotations”.43
It is, above all, Peirce’s concept of the diagram—in its function as the experimental constructor of new relations 
- which Deleuze and Guattari invest as the vector for this productive, asignifying semiotic.44 In accordance 
with their “free use” of Peirce, we find not a fidelity to Peirce’s diagram, but rather an extraction of what they 
consider to be its latent potentials—as an icon “with a distinct role, irreducible to either the icon or the symbol”. 
For them, the diagram offers a way out of the signified-signified relations of the index, icon and symbol that 
trap meaning within the binary of semiotic correspondence.45 
In this way Deleuze and Guattari sever the diagram from the Peircian framework of a representational semi-
otic - rendering it instead the agent of breakthrough of the regime of representation, and the construction of the 
new, where this “new” has no basis in, or possible subjection to, what has actually been.46 This is not a new that 
will, under certain conditions, sometime in the future be recognised and established (as Peirce’s diagrammatic 
futures one day will), but the new that “remains forever new”. This is a qualitatively new, that “calls forth 
forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely 
other model”, one of pure difference “in-itself” (difference beyond/outside all identity), the encounter with 
which “strips thought of its ‘innateness’, and treats it every time as something which has not always existed, 
but begins, forced and under constraint.”47 
Thus, the diagram is put to work for the sake of a philosophy of difference “in-itself”, as the synthesiser or 
“modulator” of difference, in contrast to Peirce’s representational synthesiser of forms that refines and builds 
upon already established processes of thinking, and which projects possibility on the basis of what is (already 
established and known to be) possible. For Deleuze, “the problem is not to direct or methodically apply a 
thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature [which might be said to characterise the model Peirce 
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upholds], but to bring into being that which does not yet exist … To think is to create.”48
However, whilst Peirce is explicit in his presentation of thought as diagrammatic, Deleuze is not. This 
difference should be taken less as a measure of the relative importance they attribute to the notion, but rather 
as a reflection of the differing ways in which they present their philosophical systems: in Peirce’s case, an 
“organic” systematisation that attempts to move ever closer to increasing refinement and completion of itself 
encompasses precise, and consistent, exposition of diagrammatics; in Deleuze’s case, an “open” system, 
supporting on-going conceptual creation that forbids any “essentialising” self-presentation, or, re-presentation 
of it, forces from the “reader” a re-construction of diagrammatics from the various instances of its appearance 
in his work.49 Whereas we were able to re-present Peirce’s own pronouncements on the diagram, practising 
a consistency with the representational tenor of his system, and indeed, with his definition of diagrams as 
representing the representational processes of thought, Deleuze forces us to produce a construction beyond 
his own explicit pronouncements—something which, again, is consistent with his view that philosophy and 
its concepts should not be reflected on, but used, and put to work on a “line of flight” that displaces them from 
their “origins”; of philosophy as a creative rather than re-productive or communicative enterprise, and his 
definition of the diagram as a map that does not represent, even something real, but functions to create a new 
kind of reality, a reality “yet to come”.50 And it is precisely such a view—of a creative practice of philosophy 
deforming its inherited history - that is indubitably put to work in Deleuze’s unfaithful reworking of Peirce’s 
diagramatism.
The notion that insists, without explicit presentation, in Deleuze’s philosophy that the creation, or genesis of 
thought is diagrammatic is one which thus requires an elaboration beyond exegesis.51 The new reality “yet to 
come” is as it is for Peirce, a new thought reality. But in contrast to Peirce’s ideal reality, it is a reality that is 
immanent to the matter of real experience. 
◊
We encounter Deleuze’s diagram, with its “distinct role, irreducible to neither the icon or the symbol” in 
three key texts: A Thousand Plateaus (1980), Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation (1981), and Foucault (1986). 
Across these texts, the diagram is presented as the agent of a construction that involves a destruction of existing 
“givens” and the production of the “new”. In A Thousand Plateaus, it is “a map of [the forces beneath] what 
is blocked” or “overcoded” in a regime of signs, that permits “original interactions”, and “plays a piloting 
role”.52 In Francis Bacon, after Bacon’s own description of his process of painting, it is “the operative set 
of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines and zones, line-strokes and color-patches” that catastrophises the 
visual givens of painting and permits the emergence of new “possibilities of fact” in the form of a “figure”. In 
Foucault, after Foucault’s own reference to the diagram as “that which makes power-relations function”, it is 
“the map of relations between forces”.53 In this reading of Foucault, Deleuze further conceptualises the diagram 
as the synthesiser of thought, where thinking is no longer “the innate exercise of a faculty, but must happen 
to thought”; that “does not depend on an interiority uniting the visible and the utterable but takes place under 
the intrusion of the outside that carves the interval” in “the formless disjunction” where the diagram acts, as 
thought’s genetic element.54  
This reading of Foucault’s diagram suggests that Deleuze’s semiotic conception of the diagram is—as it is too 
for Peirce - inseparable from a certain conception of thought. For both thinkers, thought happens in signs. But 
the notion of an “a-signifying” semiotics—to which diagrammatic agency is for Deleuze central - would have 
been unintelligible to Peirce. Asignification functions to explode the proliferation of meaning permitted and 
legitimated by structures and processes of reference, and to subvert the possibility of communication, “which 
only works under the sway of opinions in order to create ‘consensus’”.55 A-signifying signs do not refer and 
re-produce; they produce. Thus, asignification is incorporated into an expanded concept of the sign. Whilst 
for Peirce, the sign is a “representamen”, with “representative quality”, for Deleuze, signs “are not signs of a 
thing; they are signs of the passages of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, they mark a certain threshold 
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crossed in the course of these movements”; the sign is “what flashes across the intervals when a communication 
takes place between disparates”—a “communication” that, again, is an a-signifying relation, a new order of 
communication that bears no allegiance to common sense, or to an already existing community of thinkers.56 
Deleuze’s definition of the diagram as the “height of abstraction, but also the moment at which abstraction 
becomes real”57 could have been taken from Peirce - and indicates their shared constructivist position (that 
reality becomes real through a construction). But for Deleuze this “abstraction” does not entail schematic 
simplification of the formal outlines of a problem, and this “reality” has no basis in, or resemblance to any 
previous reality (whether conceived, or existing). “Abstraction” designates rather the intensive (differential, 
prior to the distinction interior/exterior), “machinic” (immanently and non-deterministically functional) and 
genetic (immanently creative/constructive) plane of forces that “precedes” formalisation and from which “a 
real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” emerges.   Deleuze’s diagram acts as an “abstract machine”, 
a “pure Matter-function” with no form or substance of its own, impelled not by a problem posed to the form 
of thought that can recognise it as a provisional and subjective moment in the progressive elaboration of our 
knowledge (as it is in Peirce’s diagrammatism), but rather by the encounter with pure difference/intensity 
that forces a creation that affirms it, violently projecting thought onto a plane beyond that of its own natural 
progression. 
This genesis of thought has a transcendental element, where transcendental designates the plane of the real in 
its “exceptional conditions” of pure difference. That is, whilst immanent to “real” experience (the diagram is 
“entirely oriented toward an experimentation [or experience] in contact with the real”58) it concerns a genesis 
that invests the intensive, and transcendental, forces of the “outside” (the “nonthought within thought”59) as the 
conditions for a “new” reality.
Whilst Peirce’s diagrammatic thought expands thought beyond what is immediately self-evident to it by 
constructing mediated possibilities on the basis of what is inherently possible for thought, Deleuze’s diagram 
is a construction of new possibilities that explode that which inheres in thought, explode thought as a form of 
inherence, and forces thought on a “line of flight” with the “outside” (the intensive “outside” of pure difference). 
“To think is always to follow the witch’s flight” on the plane of “machinic” intensities/forces, of unliveable 
possibilities that could not have been projected on the basis of what already exists, and shatters what thought 
can already think. A “thought without image” is opposed to the thought with image that recognizes itself in 
the act of thinking and subjects thinking to a self-grounding in its representational activity. This “thought 
without image” is a “thought which is born in thought, the act of thinking which is neither given by innateness 
nor presupposed by reminiscence but engendered in its genitality”, a thought that thinks only by means 
of difference around a point of ungrounding.60 Deleuze’s constructivism expresses this genesis of thought 
(reminding us that his interest in Peirce is from the very perspective of the genesis of signs). “Constructivism 
requires every creation to be a construction on a plane that gives it an autonomous existence.”61 Thought as 
creation (construction) of the “autonomous” new (that which has liberated itself from all allegiance to a ground, 
and persists independently of those who have or will experience it) is posited against thought as reflection in 
its own image.
Within such a framework, the diagram functions as the antithesis of the image—which, in its iconic character, 
Peirce’s diagram very much remains. Peirce’s diagram constructs and upholds an image of thought that is 
superimposed onto an actual reality “outside” of thought. This, we recall, is what constitutes Peirce’s idealism 
- diagrammatic construction is ideal, even if for it to attain meaning, it must bear a relation to experience, a 
relation that will be tested in order to refine the reasoning process. It is speculative rather than actual. It is 
conceivable, but has no actual existence. This idealism is of course the ground, and destination of Peirce’s 
pragmatic project—for “pragmaticism” is, we recall, defined as “the theory that a conception, that is, the 
rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable [but not actual] bearing upon 
the conduct of life”.62 
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Deleuze’s critique of thought as a form of interiority motivates his severance of the diagram from the Peircian 
category of the icon. For images or icons, he tells us, are produced through an “interior molding” where 
relations are subordinated to the form of resemblance. Diagrams, however, produce resemblance through “non-
resembling means”, through a pure modulation of relations that creates a “sensible” or “aesthetic” rather than 
a formal resemblance, an “aesthetic analogy”.63 As such, what Deleuze refers to as “the analogical language of 
the diagram” is markedly distinct to the form of analogy that characterises Peirce’s diagram. Peirce’s diagram 
formalises analogy, rendering analogy—as similitude - the ground of future determination. But Deleuze’s 
diagram constructs new relations whose analogy to their “object” is “sensible” and material, rather than formal. 
Thus, in Francis Bacon’s paintings we find the diagram acting as the informal zone of experimentation that 
permits new relations between “matter-forces” to construct the form of the new (the figure). However, though 
it ultimately assumes new form (for otherwise, it would remain a “formless and unproductive mess”). It is 
as a diagram of “sensation” that the diagram functions; its diagrammatic traits are “traits of sensation, but of 
confused sensations”. Sensation is the differential ground of diagrammatic construction - not as the sense-
data of given experience, but rather as the unliveable “being of sensation” that comprises the matter of a 
transcendental empiricism that generates new thought. 
Such a transcendental empiricism is distinguished from ordinary empiricism in so far as it does not pertain to 
sense-data (in their formalised status as qualities) but rather to the passage of sensation through unformed matter. 
Transcendental empiricism “does not refer to any object nor belong to any subject (empirical representation) … 
It is certainly not the element of sensation (simple empiricism) … rather, it is the passage from one sensation 
to another, however close two sensations may be, but as becoming, as an increase or decrease in power”.64 
This becoming of sensation, this “pure” relationality, furnishes “the conditions under which something new is 
produced (creativeness)”, conditions that are “no wider than the real” (the transcendental is not transcendent) 
but which are not given in ordinary experience as qualitative sensible data, but experienced as the intensive 
relations of forces.65 Whence Deleuze’s attribution to (a superior/transcendental) empiricism of the motto: 
relations are external to terms66 (whereas for Peirce, relations are always dependent on the terms they relate).
    
This diagrammatic constructivism is not a methodical process, if by method we understand a form of control 
possessed by the common sense of the thinker in advance of thinking, and superimposed onto the “matter” of 
what thought thinks. According to such a definition Peirce’s diagram is, precisely, the methodical regulation of 
the process of thinking as logical reasoning. Logic is “the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought”, and 
the problem of thought must be solved through method, projected by the voluntary act of reason. But Deleuze’s 
diagrammatism is not a voluntary exercise: it is instead an involuntary synthesis of difference. Experimentation 
is not methodical. For Deleuze, thought is forced in a “violent encounter” with the differentials of sensation 
that constitute the matter-force of the real, but which as intensities cannot be experienced under normal, “lived” 
conditions and are imperceptible to an empirical exercise of the faculties.  Under the exceptional circumstances 
of an “encounter” with “free or untamed states of difference in itself”, sensibility “finds itself before its own 
limit and raises itself to the level of a transcendent exercise”, an exercise that reciprocally determines the real 
sensible “object” and a sensing “subjectivity”. Transcendental empiricism pertains to the discovery of the 
conditions of the given, “that by which the given is given”—difference in-itself.67 But Peirce’s constructivism 
is grounded on the given possibilities of thought.
 
For Deleuze, it is the encounter with the “pure being of sensation” that impulses conceptual creation as a 
singular thought, with no basis for consensus. Whereas Peirce’s diagrammatism produces a reassuring 
continuity of thought, oriented towards a community of “ideal” reasoning subjects, sharing common faculties, 
and shared forms of experience (against which the conclusions of diagrammatism will be tested), Deleuze’s 
diagrammatism ruptures such continuity, and has no subject already waiting. It rather forces a new “subject” 
to be adequate to the reality it constructs on a transcendental field - the pure a-subjective, pre-reflective, 
impersonal stream of pre-consciousness without a self - a reality that has no coincidence with lived experience, 
projecting us beyond what we had thought was possible to live.
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Thus, Deleuze’s diagram and Peirce’s diagram reflect two contrasting notions of thought: thought as a process 
of discipline, regulation and control that reasoning subjects enact (Peirce), and thought as violent encounter that 
happens to us in the groundless encounter with difference (Deleuze); thought as grounded in the possibilities of 
thought as it already knows and recognises itself, and as the conditioning of a possible future continuous with 
its present form (Peirce), and thought as a creative and violent destruction of thought in its present form for 
the sake of a new image of a thought without image (Deleuze); thought as pragmatic experimentation for the 
sake of the determination of real effects through their conception (Peirce), and thought as an experimentation 
that effects a new possibility of pragmatism as the transformation of the existing state of liveable affairs in 
the genesis of the hitherto unthinkable new that shatters the experience of continuity as lived time (Deleuze). 
These distinctions between Peirce’s and Deleuze’s diagrammatism bear important consequences for the nature 
of the “future” that is determined in each case—which we shall now, in conclusion, explore.
 
4. DIAGRAMMATIC FUTURES: SPECULATIVE RHETORIC/CONSTRUCTIVISM
For both Deleuze and Peirce, the function of the diagram is to “determine” a future reality. But there are here, 
and not unexpectedly, two distinct notions of the future: a speculative (conceived but not actual) future in 
Peirce’s case, and a constructed future in Deleuze’s (as the intensive, differential reality of the present).
What Peirce calls the “compelling design” of the diagram renders it the principle agent of that branch of 
semiotic method he calls “speculative rhetoric”. The “highest and most living branch of logic”, the function of 
speculative rhetoric is to ascertain the formal conditions of a sign’s effects, “to ascertain the laws by which in 
every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another”.68 
That is, speculative rhetoric pertains to the way in which signs determine, through law, their future effects. 
Futurity is the destination of Peirce’s semiotics: indeed, “the conclusion of a Reasoning proper must refer to 
the Future”.69 It is insofar as the diagram is the method of discovering such laws that it is seen as the agent of 
this speculation. As such, diagrammatic constructivism is for Peirce speculative—it speculates on a general 
form of the future through the construction of laws. What might be called “diagrammatic speculation” thus 
pertains to the futurity of signs in their continuing effectiveness, a futurity which assumes a general form, and 
is conceived, ideal, and hypothetical, rather than actual (although of course the great Peircian hope is that one 
day, in the ideal circumstances, and when we have had time to undertaken sufficient experimentation, it will 
become actual).
Speculative rhetoric concerns the sign’s “power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to 
interpretants”70, where the interpretant is the destination or effect of the sign.71 For Peirce’s sign is, we recall, 
tripartite—it “is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses 
somebody that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That 
sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign.”72 The interpretant, the “third” element of semiosis, 
in turn acts as a sign/representamen (a first), to determine another interpretant (another third), through the Same 
object (a second)—and so on apparently till infinity (but actually up until the final interpretant is reached). 
Peirce’s semiotic is a dynamic, continuous and ongoing process of the determination of meaning grounded in 
the presupposed law of similitude.73 
As the study of the determination of the futurity of signs, of their interpretants, speculative rhetoric concerns 
the sign’s thirdness. By this is meant that mode of being of law, which consists in the fact that future relations 
(or “facts of secondness”) “will take on a determinate general character”.74  Thirdness is that future effect which 
is determined by the diagrammatic process. This, we recall, constitutes the constructive aspect of the diagram. 
Beyond its character as a representation of relations (a second), it is, in its construction of new relations, its 
experimental addition of a “May-be” to a given premise, a determination (thorough the substantiation of the 
form of relations) of a future conclusion as law-giver. The function of the diagram is to determine what general 
effects can be determined, through laws, given certain conditions (the conditions we know, or will come to 
know, all about, since the diagram is of our own creation.)
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This diagrammatic experimentation is conducted within the regime of the possible—the possibilities that 
thought can in its present form think. It concerns the sign’s capacity to determine an interpretant, making no 
claims as to actuality—what individuals actually think. The future that the diagram speculatively infers, the 
future that can be thought, is predictable on the basis of what is thinkable, and will be similar to it—what 
should be thinkable through the constructions of diagrams. The possible future is determined by and grounded 
upon present actualities of thought (the actual conclusions of reasoning) attained through diagrammatic 
constructivism in the present. Thirdness imparts a quality to reactions in the future by “moulding in conformity 
with the form of a proposition [produced in the present]—a form which is constructed through diagrams”.75  It 
is because of this conformism to ideal constructions, because it is assumed that the future is continuous with 
the present, and because it is assumed that thinking subjects can all think in the same way, that the diagram can 
be believed to compel assent amongst interpreting subjects in the future.  
Diagrammatic speculation concerns the control—generated in the present - of future conduct. It is a means too 
of escaping the past actualities of existence that haunt our memory and over which we have no control (insofar 
as, in Peirce’s understanding here, memory is involuntary). Indeed, “the only controllable conduct is Future 
conduct.” And that which in the Future “is not amenable to control are the things that we shall be able to infer, 
or should be able to infer under favourable circumstances [or conditions].”76  The function of the diagram, and 
its “strategic design”, is to effect this purchase over the future. As the conclusion of reasoning, the future is a 
general form, a formal possibility that, though it may “little resemble even the perceptual facts”, and whose 
coincidence with the “matter” of future cases remains to be tested, does resemble conceived facts. 
 
Deleuze’s theory of the diagrammatic production of the future as qualitatively new rejects this formal 
determinism, and mediation, of speculation.77 Whence his rejection of the Peircian category of the interpretant—
his rejection of the perspective of representation, mediation, grounding, speculative finality and common sense 
in favour of a genetic perspective, that considers the sign’s productivity through the diagrammatic construction 
of relations from asignifying sign-matter. Whilst for Peirce, the sign is a “representamen”, with “representative 
quality”, for Deleuze, signs “are not signs of a thing; they are signs of the passages of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization” - the deterritorialization of common sense and the reterritorialization of new sense 
produced in the affirmation of asignifying difference, a new order of communication that bears no allegiance 
to common sense, or to an already existing community of thinkers. And the new here is not a general form, but 
the affirmation of that which is irreducibly singular in the matter of experience.  
For both Peirce and Deleuze, to think is to determine—but whereas for Peirce, this determination is a means of 
controlling our future in accordance with our projections constructed in the present, for Deleuze, thought is a 
determination of the new from the immanent affirmation of difference that destroys the present form, or image, 
of thought. Determination here is at once (reciprocally) of matter and the (new) form of the real—an immanent 
genesis that bypasses the problem of the dualism of idealism and empiricism that Peirce’s diagrammatism, 
despite its heroic attempts to the contrary, ostensibly retains (that is, the problem of how the ideal coincides 
with the empirical), by investing as its source pure difference/intensity in the disjunction between the sensible 
and the conceptual. For Peirce, the control of the Future is effected through the projection of our reasoned 
thought. But for Deleuze, the experience of the Future as the new happens to us, and is something over which 
we have no voluntary control, and, indeed, excludes the self.78  Peirce’s future is always deferred—it is what will 
happen “given a certain set of conditions”. But Deleuze’s new future is experienced now, in the transcendental 
encounter with difference that raises us beyond the lived coordinates of the present.79
Peirce’s speculative future is mediated. His diagram is a mediating third, acting between forms—the form of 
the past and the form of the future, which are separated by the continuous line of time.80 But Deleuze’s diagram 
can only be thought of as a “third” in a peculiar way—as intensive agency rather than mediation - that is, not 
between two forms situated on the plane of representation, and separated by time as chronological unfurling, 
but functioning on an intensive, transcendental plane of forces.81 Deleuze’s diagrammatic determination takes 
place not as mediation but as the groundless and unmediated repetition of force. The diagram is the “immanent 
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cause” that enacts “the power of repetition as a machinic force”.82 Diagrammatic synthesis of difference takes 
place as repetition—but not as the repetition as voluntary control (Peirce’s methodical control over the diagram, 
where we rationally “select the features of the diagram which it will be pertinent to pay attention to”) but as 
the affirmation of the intensive difference that makes itself return against all control and method, as “a power 
which affirms itself against the law, which works underneath laws, perhaps superior to laws”: repetition as the 
return of an original chance encounter with difference. 
Deleuze’s diagrammatic synthesis as affirmation of difference challenges law, denouncing its “nominal or 
general character in favour of a more profound and more artistic reality”.83 Diagrammatic synthesis produces 
a singular reality as the impersonal affirmation of the differential being of sensation in a process (rather than 
the domain of actual works of art) whose forms are not determined in advance. The diagrammatic violence 
of sensation is an act, not a product, a shock of multiplicity that fractures the subject’s purchase on time. So 
in his affirmation of the chance eruptions of pure matter-forces of paint, in his creation of a new figure from 
his diagrams, Francis Bacon becomes an artist, or more precisely, a “cosmic artisan”, leaving “the milieus and 
the earth”—the terrain of the lived—behind to become the bearer of a new world.84 Chance is affirmed as a 
construction accompanying destruction. The new is not sketched in the present, and projected as a conceived 
form (as a formal design of a product to come)—it emerges now, in the act of diagramming that splits the 
emerging from the lived and formed present. 
Peirce’s diagram functions, precisely, as a sketch of what will one day come, given thought’s natural progression. 
It is never fully actually embodied: its laws are how “an endless future must continue to be”.85 Thought is an 
ongoing process of self-determination, reflecting an evolutionary model premised on the presupposition that 
the universe is “progressing from a state of all but pure chance to a state of all but complete determination by 
law”.86 This progressive movement of thought is grounded in a final interpretant, which, whilst never attained, 
would be “the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently 
considered.”87 It is the projected existence of this final interpretant, or truth, that protects Peirce’s system from 
the threat of infinitely substitutable meaning. For through it we are given to understand that there is one destiny 
of thought, which unites thinking subjects, driving and imparting purpose to their collective thought and action.
But for Deleuze, the very idea of thought’s progress would be a betrayal of its chance encounters with difference; 
the very notion of a conceivable destiny as a continuation of what we already know abhorrent. Instead, chance 
is the first moment of a rupture with the form of thought as custom, and all that can be thought, the moment of 
a radical discontinuity when thought is seized by the intensive forces of the unthought outside, and generated 
in a new form through a diagrammatic map of a destiny hitherto unconceivable. There is no deferral to an 
anticipated speculative future here, but the emergence all at once of the new. The future is now, coextensive 
with the event of construction—a creation in the present that splits the time of the now or the current from the 
lived present in which we exist as historical agents - the experience of which generates new coordinates of life.
Peirce’s diagrammatic projection of the form of the future “turns upon the perception of generality and 
continuity at every step.”88 It is a progressive process, laid out in a linear and continuous time. And, as an 
evolutionary conception of thought, it is part of a lived history, where this “history” is understood as the 
ongoing and communal summation of our thought processes. The rational agent is a historical agent, inscribed 
in the shared thought processes of his predecessors, and speculating for a future agent who shares his own. He 
is subjected to history, and the reasoning processes that are constructed for all time. But Deleuze’s diagram 
breaks through the historical continuity of forms and the linear time it presupposes, and “when it constitutes 
points of creation or potentiality it does not stand outside history but is instead always “prior to” history.”89 This 
“prior” is not chronological antecedence. Whereas Peirce’s diagram projects the future through a law that casts 
the form of the Same through linear, continuous, and chronological time, Deleuze’s diagram ejects the future 
under the force of an exceptional event, throwing time out of joint, drawing together the before and the after 
into the deranged circle of affirmation. 
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This is the polemical horizon, whose consequences demand further exploration, of Deleuze’s diagrammatic 
thought - a thought of the new beyond history, through which we become agents of critique and creation, 
cosmic artisans acting not in the name of what we already are as circumscribed by the labour of history, 
but acting under the impulse of a shock, for an unknowable but experiencable time to come. It is here, in 
the excesses of the diagrammatic construction of the new in a now that catastrophises the lived present and 
the future that would naturally unfold from it, here, in a diagrammatic empiricism where a new reality is 
experienced to make sense now without needing to wait for a deferred future to acquire meaning, here in a 
diagrammatic transformation of the lived that splices through the burdensome continuity of lived suppositions 
and liveable possibilities - that we perhaps encounter the most profound consequences of Deleuze’s reworking 
of Peirce’s diagram—the conquest of time.
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